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V. Torts
A. Public Health and the New York Times Doctrine--United
Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
The qualified privilege of fair comment protects good faith pub-
lishers of defamatory statements speaking on matters of public con-
cern.' This privilege is limited "to those matters which are of legitimate
concern to the community as a whole because they materially affect
the interests of all of the community."2  Until 1964, the majority of
American jurisdictions held the fair comment rule inapplicable to de-
famatory false statements of fact.3 The privilege was limited to "opin-
ion, comment or criticism."4  The minority view, following Justice
Burch's famous opinion in Coleman v. MacLennan,5 extended the
privilege to include misstatements of fact. In 1964, the Supreme Court
decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6 nationalized the minority
view on criticism of the "official conduct" of "public officials," two
terms left expressly undefined by the Court.7  The Court held that the
freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment were
not defeasible because of factual error.8 Indeed, factual error even
1. For good discussions of the "fair comment" rule, see Boyer, Fair Comment,
15 OHIO. ST. L.J. 280 (1954); Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TExAs L. REv. 41 (1929);
Thayer, Fair Comment as a Defense, 25 Wis. L. REv. 288 (1950).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 110, at 812 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
3. See id. at 814-15.
4. Id. at 814; see Note, 31 TENN. L. REV. 504, 507-08 (1964).
5. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 283 n.23. In a later case, Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966),
the Court said that the public official designation should apply "at the very least to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of govern-
mental affairs." Id. at 85. See Extension of Sullivan's Actual Malice Standard to
Defamation of Public Figures, 2 GEORGIA L. REv. 393, 416 (1968), where the author
states: "The 'public official' requirement, expanded [since New York Times] to a
more flexible requirement, [now] encompasses officials in the lower echelons of
government and persons who voluntarily entered public discussion to influence a matter
of public concern. The 'official conduct' requirement, extended by [Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)], includes any statements which might be applicable to an
official's fitness for office, regardless of inquiry to his private reputation."
8. "[F]actual error [does not suffice] to remove the constitutional shield from
criticism of official conduct .... "376 U.S. at 273.
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when coupled with defamatory content is not constitutionally sufficient
to defeat the privilege established by New York Times.9 Only when
the public official can prove that the defamatory statement was made
with actual malice will he be allowed recovery for the injury to his
reputation.1° -Negligence is not a basis of recovery even where injury
to the public official is grievous and the factual untruth substantial. 1
United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem12 extends the privilege enunciated in New York Times to "dis-
closure and discussion of professional practices and conditions in the
health area."' 3 Nowhere to be found in the opinion is a definition of
this phrase that might provide guidelines for the future application
of the "health area' privilege.
United Labs involved a libel suit brought against a national tele-
vision network by a large medical testing laboratory doing business by
mail. The plaintiff corporation alleged that it had been injured in its
reputation and had suffered an appreciable decrease in business be-
cause of three consecutive nightly television broadcasts, radio broad-
casts, and press releases prepared and published by the defendant.
These publications constituted an expos6 of the inaccuracies of clinical
tests conducted by mail-order laboratories.' 4 As the plaintiff was not
named in any of these publications, it asserted that all reputable mail-
order clinical laboratories, and specifically itself, had been defamed by
the publications in question. The plaintiff did not challenge the truth
of the defendant's statements, but challenged rather the "implication of
the publications that such inaccuracies were characteristic of the testing
9. Id.
10. "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
11. "[NJegligence . . . is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness
that is required for a finding of actual malice." Id. at 288; accord, Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th
Cir. 1966).
12. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968).
13. Id. at 711.
14. CBS, acting through several cooperating physicians, submitted clinical speci-
mens for testing to 22 mail-order medical laboratories throughout the country. Identi-
cal specimens were at the same time sent to local New York City testing facilities of
the highest standards. The results of the several tests were compared, reflecting a
high degree of inaccuracy in the tests conducted by the participating mail-order
laboratories. These inaccuracies were the topic of a special three part series of news
commentaries done by Walter Cronkite over the CBS television network. No med-
ical laboratories in the state of Oregon, where the plaintiff was doing business, were
tested or named in the publications; in fact, only one laboratory was specifically
named in the entire series of broadcasts.
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work of all mail-order laboratories, including itself."'15 Following the
district court's disposal of the case by summary judgment for the de-
fendant,16 the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds.
Stated briefly, United Labs holds that innocently or negligently
made defamatory misstatements of fact, involving matters of public
health, come within the immunity granted by the first amendment.
This immunity is defeated only by proof of "convincing clarity" that
the defendant was motivated by actual malice in publishing the de-
famatory statements.' 7 The Ninth Circuit found no difficulty in ex-
tending the first amendment immunity announced in New York Times
to the field of public health.' 8  The opinion cites approvingly many
prior extensions of the New York Times doctrine of other matters of
public interest'9 and draws analogies between some of the cited de-
cisions and the facts at hand.
In disposing of the controversy, the district court had held that the
statements were not of and concerning the plaintiff,2" making "no
reference to an ascertainable 'class' of laboratories." 2 The trial court
opinion also implies that the statements in dispute were not in fact de-
15. 404 F.2d at 712.
16. United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 258
F. Supp. 735 (D. Ore. 1966).
17. 404 F.2d at 712.
18. Id.
19. For applications of the doctrine to "public figures," see Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (joint opinion); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat
Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co.,
335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum). The doctrine has also been applied in an
invasion of privacy suit concerning a "matter of public interest." Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). And to a defamation suit involving a "matter of important
public concern." Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969). A recent
case extended the doctrine to public accommodations: "By opening its doors to travelers
an innkeeper invites both guests and criticism of the inn." Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704, 707 (S.D. Ga. 1969). The New York Times rule has been
restated and further defined by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases involving the
official conduct of public officials. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
(criminal libel case). The doctrine has also been applied to protect a public official
(state legislator) "criticizing public policy and the implementation of it." Bond v.
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966). And to a candidate for a state political office.
Dyer v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App. 1966). And to protect a candidate for
alderman who accused the city's mayor and the mayor's law firm of a conflict of
interest when the mayor's law partner brought an action for defamation against said
candidate. Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964). The
court said: "It would be anamolous to hold that the Mayor, as a public office
holder, was precluded by the New York Times case from suing in libel on a conflict
of interest issue affecting his law firm, but that his law partner was individually free
to do so on the same subject matter." Id. at 526, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
20. 258 F. Supp. at 740.
21. Id. at 741.
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famatory."2 A casual reading of the statements complained of confirms
either of these propositions. 23  Assuming, arguendo, that the statements
were in fact both defamatory and of and concerning the plaintiff,
the defendant would probably still have been protected by the fair com-
ment rule, for the statements were more in the nature of opinion
than fact. The Ninth Circuit refused to decide the case on any of these
grounds, however, choosing rather to base its decision on a constitu-
tional issue, the actual malice doctrine discussed herein. The Supreme
Court has denied certiorari.24
It is important to note that the word "malice" is not intended in
it's perjorative connotation; 25 rather, it perpetuates the anachronistic
legal fiction that malice is required to maintain an action for defama-
tion. As specified by United Labs, actual malice is the publication of
defamatory misstatements of fact "with knowledge that they were false
in their alleged implications . . . or . . . with reckless disregard of
whether they were false or not."26  In this context, knowledge is
analogous to scienter, 27 a frame of mind characteristic of intentional
torts. The standard for reckless disregard comes very close to a re-
quirement of actual knowledge.2" Prosser defines "reckless" as follows:
The usual meaning assigned to . . . "reckless" . . . is that the
actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in
22. "[N]o 'charges' were made or insinuated .... The materials here in issue
are perhaps best described as 'calling into question' the practices of mail-order labor-
atories generally, and the reliability of mail-order testing itself." Id. at 740.
23. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
24. 394 U.S. 921 (1969).
25. See note 10 supra. Malice does not mean "hatred, ill-will or enmity or a
wanton desire to injure." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).
26. 404 F.2d at 712.
27. "Scienter," as defined in BLAcK's LAW DIcnIoNAY 1512 (4th ed. 1951), is
"an allegation . . . setting out the defendant's previous knowledge of the cause which
led to the injury complained of, or rather his previous knowledge of a state of facts
which it was his duty to guard against, and his omission to do which has led to the
injury complained of.... And the term is frequently used to signify the defendant's
guilty knowledge."
28. "[TIhe reckless disregard test, as applied to public officials in [New York
Times and Garrison], is a stringent test, almost the equivalent of requiring culpable
knowledge." Note, 46 N.C.L. REv. 393, 395 (1968). See Extension of Sullivan's
Actual Malice Standard to Defamation of Public Figures, 2 GEORGIA L. REv. 393,
419 (1968), where the author states: "[PIlaintiffs appear to be faced with an insur-
mountable task in proving actual malice unless an intent to injure through falsehood
can be shown. Although Sullivan included 'reckless disregard' of a statement's truth or
falsity within its definition of 'actual malice,' it is difficult to ascertain what proof
requirements are necessary to establish reckless disregard. The 'reckless disregard'
test loses significance in view of the more stringent burden of proving actual malice
imposed by Garrison and Henry v. Collins [380 U.S. 356 (1965)] which require a
high degree of awareness of the probable falsity or an intent to injure through false-
hood."
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disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be
taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow. It is usually accompanied by a
conscious indifference to the consequences, amounting almost to
willingness that they shall follow .... 29
Since New York Times, two Supreme Court decisions have de-
fined "reckless disregard": The defendant must have published the
statements with a "high degree of awareness of their probable falsity"30
or he must have "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publi-
cation."'" Practically speaking, liability can ensue only from actual
knowledge that the statements of fact were false or a refusal to investi-
gate for fear of discovering the truth after one has been put upon notice
of inquiry. Absent proof by the plaintiff of one of the above criteria,
no recovery for even the most devastating defamation will be allowed.
It is granted that the actual malice standard does encourage a
more liberal exchange of ideas on matters of public concern. In effect,
however, all but the intentional lie is given constitutional protection. The
unintentionally injured and innocent plaintiff is left to suffer uncompen-
sated, his reputation becoming a martyr to society's interest in free
speech and press. Does society's interest in granting a broader im-
munity for the discussion of health issues justify the corresponding de-
nial of civil recourse to an injured plaintiff?
It is imperative before proceeding further that we define and de-
limit precisely the scope of the problem to be examined. We are con-
cerned only with a defamatory misstatement of fact, of and concerning
one other than a public official, not made knowingly or in reckless dis-
regard of its truth or falsity. Of course, any defamatory false state-
ment of fact, made with actual knowledge that it is false or in reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity, is not protected, even by New York
Times, regardless of who or what it is about. The actual malice standard
solely as applied to matters other than the official conduct of public
officials is in question. As applied to official conduct of public officials,
this standard concededly has much to recommend it, as will be dis-
cussed below. Further, it must be remembered that the actual malice
standard is applied only to defamatory factual misstatements. Com-
ment, criticism, and opinion on matters of public concern, it has been
seen, are protected by the fair comment rule. Thus, one is exempt from
civil liability in publishing defamatory opinion, comment, or criticism,
as long as it is fair, on any matter of substantial public concern. It
should also be noted that even defamatory misstatements of fact can-
not be the subject matter of civil liability if they are not of and con-
29. PROSSER § 34, at 188-89.
30. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
31. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
cerning a specific individual or individuals, either real or legal. Thus,
one may safely say, for example, that "all lawyers are shysters," "all
doctors are quacks," or "all medical testing laboratories are inaccu-
rate in their results and are a serious detriment to the public health."
In these examples, there is no judicially cognizable individual or class of
individuals at which the defamatory attack was leveled. 2  In addition,
truth, called justification in the law of defamation, is an absolute bar to
civil liability.33  With this in mind we are ready to proceed with an
analysis of the actual malice standard.
What cries for examination is the court's reliance on the criterion of
actual malice and the theoretical imperative that dictates the application
of this seemingly one-sided standard to the field of public health.
Although the Supreme Court in New York Times limited its de-
cision to the facts in controversy and avoided speculation on the ultimate
expansion of the actual malice standard, 34 the United Labs opinion
states:
It is, of course, not possible to say just how far the Court will con-
tinue to carry such extensions. But unless all other areas, not
merely those of legitimatei general interest but also those . . .
affecting personal concern to the public, are to be artificially
ignored, we are not able to see how the path upon which the Court
has been moving can be regarded as having reached an end.35
This statement reflects the Ninth Circuit's willingness to extend indis-
criminately the actual malice criterion to all cases involving "matters of
public concern" without an examination of the basic premises upon
which New York Times is founded. As stated by one author:
[T]he [New York Times] opinion [conveys] the following crucial
syllogism: The central meaning of the [First] Amendment is that
seditious libel cannot be made the subject of government sanction.
The Alabama rule on fair comment is closely akin to making
seditious libel an offense. The Alabama rule therefore violated
the central meaning of the Amendment.36
32. "Two or more persons may of course be defamed by the same publication.
But difficulties arise when the defamatory words are directed at a group or class of
persons rather than an individual. The plaintiff must first of all show that he is in
fact a member of the class defamed. Beyond this, he must establish some reasonable
personal application of the words to himself. If the group is a very large one, as in
the case of such words as 'al lawyers are shysters,' they are considered to have no
application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not
only does the group as such have no action, but the plaintiff does not establish any
personal reference to himself." PRossER § 106, at 767-68.
33. Id. § 111, at 824.
34. 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964).
35. 404 F.2d at 711.
36. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 209 [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
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United Labs was not a case of seditious libel."17  It, like many prior
extension of the New York Times doctrine,38 involved a "matter of
public interest," but not a governmental or political matter. While the
distinction between criticism of the government, including, of course,
the official conduct of public officials, and criticism on matters of pub-
iec interest may be at times vague and hard to discern, it is nonetheless
very real. It is readily apparent that the latter category is much broader
than and includes the former. While the criterion of the official conduct
of public officials has definable limits, matters of public interest can
logically include almost anything that at the moment happens to be of
interest to the public,39 even when the very defamatory publication
complained of was solely responsible for making it a matter of public
interest.4"
Accepting, with reservations, that the mandate of the first amend-
ment requires the New York Times standard for implementation of
the freedoms of speech and press in cases involving the official conduct
37. "Seditious libel" is "[a] written or printed document containing seditious
matter or published with a seditious intention ....... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1523 (4th ed. 1951). "Sedition" is defined as "[an attempt] made by meetings or
speeches, or by publications, to disturb the tranquillity of the state." Id. at 1523.
38. See cases cited note 19 supra.
39. "Logically, any issue about which the public might form an opinion could
become a 'public' issue, and any individual, however inadvertently or falsely allied
with that issue, would lose the protection currently afforded by defamation laws."
Note, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 424, 431 (1967).
40. The "public figure" and "matters of public concern" tests, both extensions of
the "public-official-official-conduct" test of New York Times, "may have been intended
to require that some degree of public curiosity about the plaintiff exist prior to the offen-
sive publication. But while Butts [plaintiff in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967)] had once been well known, at the time of the libel [he was a] discarded
coach with the prospect of a life of quiet obscurity before him, no longer a figure of
prominence even in the sports world. Only because of the Post's story was he again
in the public eye. The Hill [Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)] decision seems
even more openly to have adopted a circular definition of the scope of the privilege.
More than two years after their brief and highly unwelcome moment in the public eye,
the Hill family was a 'matter of public interest' only because of the very Life magazine
article about which they complained. Taken at the extreme, the Court's tests would
make the press the arbiter of its own constitutional protection: by the very act of
printing an article sufficiently sensational to arouse public interest, the press would
insulate itself from liability." Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 69, 163 (1967).
"Newsworthiness will almost certainly become a descriptive and not a normative
term. In brief, the press will be the arbiters of it and the Court will be forced to yield
to the argument that whatever the press prints is by virtue of that fact newsworthy.
This has been pretty much the experience with the common-law policy. . . . [Tihe
logic of New York Times and Hill taken together grants the press some measure of
constitutional protection for anything the press thinks is a matter of public interest."
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967
Sup. CT. REV. 267, 284.
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of public officials, it does not follow that protection of those same free-
doms requires an extension of the doctrine to the field of public health.
41
While "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, and . . .may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
. . .sharp attacks on government and public officials,"42 the same wide-
scale protection is not needed for misstatements of fact of and con-
cerning medical testing laboratories and public hospitals, for example.
The distinction reaches the very heart of the interests sought to be pro-
tected in the two respective fields. The preservation of a viable de-
mocracy requires free and unfettered discussion of political issues and
public officials, 43 who are the elected representatives of the people.
Democracy, we are told, is government "of the people, by the people,
and for the people." To ensure political freedom, the essence of a true
democracy, we must at all costs provide the people with a forum from
which to express opinions and criticism of their government, no matter
how repulsive their views may be to society in general.
A concomitant widescale extension of first amendment rights to the
field of public health, however, does not foster society's interest in
the continuum of democracy. While we allow, and indeed encourage,
every citizen to participate actively in government, the field of public
health has of necessity always been left to the supervision of health ex-
perts. The public's interest in health is indeed as great as its interest
in government, but discussion of health issues does considerably less to
promote those interests than does the discussion of political issues to
promote the principles of government to which we as a nation are com-
41. "'Matters of public interest' potentially range from criticism of government
and its officials to private gossip and scandal; unless one takes the position that all
libel ... actions should be constitutionally forbidden, it seems clear that this entire
spectrum does not merit the full protection of the New York Times privilege. If the
rationale of New York Times is taken seriously, political speech--discussion of issues
about which governments make decisions-deserves fullest constitutional protection.
Not only is it functionally most important but it is also a form of expression quite
likely to be subjected to official orthodoxy. Occupying an intermediate position on the
spectrum of social utility and hence to be given less 'breathing space' at the expense
of other values is speech about issues of clearly pre-existing public concern, such
as art or sports. And falling into the least protected position should be statements
which are of public interest only intrinsically-statements whose social utility is purely
self-generated." Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 164
(1967).
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis
added).
43. "The concept of seditious libel strikes at the very heart of a democracy.
Political freedom ends when government can use its powers and its courts to silence its
critics. ... [DIefamation of the government is an impossible notion for a democ-
racy. . . . [T]he presence or absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel
defines the society." Kalven, supra note 32, at 205.
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mitted.4" The people are the government in a democratic society and
the view of the majority, no matter how ill-conceived, should be na-
tional policy. No one, however, would advocate public health policies
dictated by popular mandate. The people are not gifted with the exper-
tise required to make such decisions. How, then, can it be said that the
publication of an untrue and defamatory statement of fact about a health
question in any way advances society's interest in public health? If we
the people do not directly determine health policies through the exercise
of our voting franchise, we do not need the same quantum of informa-
tion on health issues that we require for making wise and well-informed
political decisions. Needless to say, there will be instances in which
the interests of the public in health issues will coincide with the exer-
cise of a political right, but such instances will be satisfactorily covered
by the New York Times doctrine without further extension: 5
Another reason for providing greater protection for political
speech than speech on other matters of public concern is found in the
absolute privilege, held by many public officials, to publish defamatory
statements. 6 Many public officials enjoy absolute immunity from civil
liability, no matter what their motives, where the defamatory publi-
cation discusses matters within the realm of their official duties. 47  In-
deed, members of Congress are expressly protected by the Constitu-
tion 48 "in respect to any speech, debate, vote, report or action done
in session."4 9 New York Times merely made the immunity reciprocal.
44. "A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication
[or, by analogy, defamation] as legal offenses without altering its nature. If. how-
ever, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society no matter what its
other characteristics." Id.
45. For example, the critic of a public health official, in the absence of actual
malice, would be fully protected from civil liability by New York Times. The United
Labs extension of the actual malice standard adds nothing in such a situation. But
to require one not a public official who is in some way engaged in the field of public
health to prove actual malice in a defamation suit is an unconscionable extension of
the privilege.
46. "The rule of absolute immunity is founded ...upon the principle that on
certain occasions it is indispensable, or at least advantageous, to the public interest
that persons should speak freely and fearlessly, uninfluenced by the possibility of
being brought to account in an action for defamation. This class of cases is
naturally a comparatively narrow one. It is strictly limited to judicial proceedings,
legislative proceedings, and certain official proceedings of executive officers of state."
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. Rv.
463, 465 (1909). The absolute privilege enjoyed by public officials applies, then, to
the public officials who may be denied civil recourse for defamation by the New York
Times rule. For example, just as one cannot defame a janitor at the White House and
claim the protection of the New York Times qualified privilege, that same janitor cannot
assert an absolute privilege for defamatory publications on matters related to his work.
47. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1959).
48. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
49. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959).
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But public figures and those engaged in fields that are of public interest
or affect the public health and well-being have no such privilege. When
no reciprocity of immunities exists and where the defamatory and un-
true statements of fact deal with nongovernmental issues, the courts,
even after considering the public policy issues involved in promoting
free speech and press, should strike the balance in favor of the injured
plaintiff.
The problem facing the courts is the reconciliation of two very
important, and often diametrically opposed, interests. On the one hand
is the individual's right to be free from defamatory attacks upon his
good name;50 on the other is society's interest in the dissemination of
ideas. The importance of these two ideals should caution the courts
against the blind application of a single standard in all defamation
cases involving the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press.51 Discussions of mere matters of concern or interest
to the general public should not be judicially decreed to be of the same
importance, and hence granted the same constitutional immunity, as
discussions of and concerning our governors, government, and govern-
ment policy and its implementation.
Especially unfair, it seems, is a rule that grants immunity to the
mass media (capable of making any person or issue a "matter of public
concern" instantaneously) when publishing statements of public inter-
est, not involving a public official, but someone involuntarily pushed
before the public by the defendant and thereby made the subject of
popular interest. 52 Requiring proof of "convincing clarity" that the
50. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966),
gives a good summary of this right when he says: "The right of a man to the protection
of his own reputation for unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty ... [This] right is
entitled to [full] recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system."
Id. at 92.
51. "It would not be unreasonably burdensome to have different standards of
proof for public figures and public officials if these standards were clearly set forth
by the Court. The first amendment does not necessarily require that a man who is
well known because of his personal qualities be exposed to the same amount of un-
compensated libel as the man who holds a public office, simply for the sake of having
one legal standard." Note, 46 N.C.L. REv. 392, 397 (1968).
52. "If the press is given free rein to comment on anyone who enters the public
arena, however unobtrusively. . . fewer people will be moved to so enter the arena.
The Court's apparent assumption that the first amendment freedoms of the press and of
speech are one is unrealistic, especially today when the publishing industry is to a
large extent controlled by a few multibillion dollar organizations. An individual
defamed by today's press is defamed before an audience of millions. Perhaps two
centuries ago he could resurrect his good name by proving his rectitude to his fellow
parishioners, but today his voice will not carry far enough. The. Court must recognize
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defendant published the defamation with actual knowledge of its fals-
ity, that he "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion,"53 or that he had a "high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity,"54 the latter two standards being the Supreme Court's defini-
tions of reckless disregard, seems to encourage the defendant to avoid
the truth and if sued plead as a defense an honest belief in what he pub-
lished. 55 Indeed, the Court has held that "failure . . . to make a prior
investigation [does not constitute] proof sufficient to present a jury
question whether the statements were published with reckless disregard
of whether they were false or not."56  Such a standard encourages jour-
nalistic irresponsibility. And since the publication is protected by the
first amendment immunity, the publisher will be far more likely to
avoid the expense and embarrassment of printing a retraction. 57  While
we may deem it necessary to subject our public officials, in the interest
of promoting our democratic ideals, to such ill treatment by the mass
media, it is certainly unfair to deny civil recourse to one involuntarily
made the subject of public interest by an irresponsible newspaper ar-
ticle or radio broadcast.
Too often the modern mass media tends to titillate rather than in-
form, too often it is more concerned with selling a newspaper than with
reporting the news. The first amendment should not stand as a shield
before such a purely economic, apolitical imperative. Surely, such ac-
tivity should be made to meet at least a standard of reasonable care.58
If the mass media is in some way restrained by making it respond in
damages for the negligent publication of libellous misstatements of fact
dealing with "matters of public concern," the benefit to society in pro-
that too free a press will only serve to stifle free speech." Note, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
649, 658 (1968).
53. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
54. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
55. "The [actual malice] rule thus fashioned . . . effectively serves to insulate
the press from judgments if simple precautions are taken. A publisher could protect
himself by refusing to investigate any article coming across his desk unless the de-
famatory statement is so ludicrous that it gives him notice on its face that it is
probably false. In this sense, the New York Times rule could be used to abrogate the
publisher's responsibility to his readers." Note, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 424, 426
(1967).
56. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1967); accord,
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
57. The Court held in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286, that "failure to retract
. . . is . . not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes."
58. "Other professional activity of great social value is carried on under a duty
of reasonable care and there is no reason to suspect the press would be less hardy
than medical practitioners or attorneys for example. The 'freedom of the press' guar-
anteed by the First Amendment, and as reflected in the Fourteenth, cannot be thought
to insulate all press conduct from review and responsibility for harm inflicted." Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 410 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tecting innocent reputations surely outweighs any detriment, if one can
be found, suffered because of its more cautious reporting practices.59
Floyd H. Shebley*
B. Servicemen's Tort Claims Against the United States-
United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969).
In United States v. Lee,1 the Ninth Circuit2 was faced with the
problem of determining the extent of government immunity from suits
by servicemen. In particular, the court had to resolve the issue of
whether the Feres rule barring all servicemen's suits arising from activi-
ties "incident to service,"3 was still good law or whether a new guideline
should be established.
The action had been filed in federal district court by the personal
representatives of James E. Lee, a sergeant on active duty in the Marine
Corps, who was killed in the crash of a military transport plane near
Santa Ana, California. Plaintiffs alleged that the crash occurred be-
cause the Federal Aviation Agency had negligently provided the de-
parting aircraft with inadequate terrain clearance information. The
government invoked the Feres rule as a bar to the suit.
4
The district court, however, ruled that this "incident to service"
rule had been so eroded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions that a
new guideline should be formulated5 and proposed that the liability of
the government to suit by active duty servicemen should "depend upon
whether or not the injuries stemmed from activities that involved an
official military relationship between the negligent person and the
claimant."' Applying this new rule to the facts in Lee, the court denied
the government's contention and allowed the suit.
59. See Note, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 424, 433 (1967), where the author states:
"I the press is to be free, it must also be responsible; it is not unreasonable to ask the
press to conform to [a] minimal standard of conduct."
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969), rev'g
261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
2. The panel consisted of Hamley and Carter, Circuit Judges, and Smith,
District Judge, District of Montana, sitting by designation.
3. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
4. United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 559-60 (9th Cir. 1968).
5. See Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
6. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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The Ninth Circuit reversed, 7 holding that a serviceman on active
duty and not on leave may not maintain an action against the govern-
ment under the Federal Tort Claims Act, even though the alleged neg-
ligence is that of an independent civilian agency. The court rejected
the district court's "official military relationship" guideline and chose
instead to rely solely on its own interpretation of the "incident to serv-
ice" rule.
The Lee decision seems to run counter to the historical trend of
diminishing government immunity. The original basis for sovereign
immunity in the United States was the common law doctrine of absolute
governmental immunity from suits. 8  The first relaxation of this doc-
trine came in 1855 when the Court of Claims was created to handle
contract claims brought against the government.9 Later, special legis-
lation such as the Shipping Act, 10 the Public Vessels Act," and the
Federal Employees Compensation Act 12 granted compensation to vari-
ous types of employees who formerly had no right to sue the govern-
ment.'3 Notwithstanding these concessions, the number of special con-
gressional bills asking compensation in situations where governmental
immunity still applied 14 increased until the Federal Tort Claims Act was
passed in 1946.15 By this Act, the government waived its immunity
from general tort liability for most claims accruing after January 1,
1945.16
The absence of a provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act spe-
cifically barring suits by servicemen against the government is the source
of the present controversy. There was no indication that Congress
merely neglected to put such a provision into the Act. Quite the con-
trary, for many years prior to passage of the Act, most of the legislative
proposals advocating waiver of government immunity had specifically
stated that servicemen should not sue the government under any cir-
cumstances.' 7  The Act, although it contained no such sweeping exclu-
sion, did specifically exclude servicemen's suits arising from combatant
7. United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968).
8. Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 RUTGERs L.
REv. 316, 317 (1954).
9. Id.
10. 39 Stat. 728 (1916) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964)).
11. 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1964)).
12. 39 Stat. 742 (1916) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-91, 793 (1964)).
13. See generally Hitch, supra note 8.
14. For a more detailed history of events leading up to the passage of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153-58 (1963).
15. 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-2680 (1964)).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
17. Hitch, supra note 8, at 318.
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activities' s or in foreign countries.19 The logical implication of these
provisions is that since Congress took pains to specify those situations
in which the serviceman was to have no right to bring suit against the
federal government, it intended that other service-related claims against
the government' should be handled by the federal court system. It is
significant to note that several early lower federal court decisions
placed this interpretation on the Act.20 Indeed, in 1949, the Supreme
Court itself allowed a serviceman who was injured while on leave to
bring suit against the government.2" The following year, however, in
Feres v. United States,22 the Court put an abrupt end to this general
trend of allowing recovery for injuries sustained by servicemen.23
The Feres case was a combination of three actions. In each ac-
tion, the claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, had sus-
tained an injury caused by the negligence of others "in the armed
forces."2 4  The Supreme Court held that "the government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."25
The first rationale 26 advanced by the Court in support of this rule
was that Congress had already provided a comprehensive system of
compensation for servicemen, and that this precluded a suit against the
government, 27 just as the system of workmen's compensation prevented
18. 28 U.S.C. 2680(j) (1964).
19. Id.
20. Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mont. 1948); Samson
v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Jefferson v. United States, 74
F. Supp. 290 (D. Md. 1947).
21. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
22. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
23. It should be noted that the Brooks case was not overruled by the Feres
decision. Servicemen injured by a government agency while on leave may still main-
tain an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act if they are not aboard a military
conveyance. Cf. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111-13 (1954); see text
accompanying note 33 infra.
24. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
25. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
26. A variety of reasons for the "incident to service" rule were given by the
Court in the Feres decision. The two discussed in this article are the comprehensive
compensation theory, and the discipline theory which is considered the main rationale.
See text accompanying note 30 infra. The other theories are not discussed in this
article because they have been generally disregarded by the courts. One is that
servicemen should not be subject to the diverse remedies of the various states to
which they might be assigned. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950).
Another theory is that the Federal Tort Claims Act extended governmental liability
to situations in which a private individual would be liable; no soldier has ever
recovered for negligence against his superiors or his government. Id. at 141-42.
See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159-63 (1963) for a concise discussion
of various aspects of the Feres case.
27. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950).
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an employee from suing his employer. The workmen's compensation
analogy might be conclusive were it not for the fact that the Supreme
Court has expressed conflicting opinions on whether the presence of
other compensation should preclude a suit under the Tort Claims Act. 28
Congress itself has expressed no opinion on the matter. All in all, the
comprehensive compensation theory seems a rather weak basis on which
to deny a serviceman his day in court.29
The second argument, and probably the real basis for the Feres
rule, is that military discipline would be adversely affected by the con-
stant threat of servicemen's suits. In this regard, the Supreme Court
said in United States v. Brown:
30
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his su-
periors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline,
and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort
Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Court
[in Feres] to read that Act as excluding claims of that character. 31
Cases denying recovery to servicemen injured while on leave, but
riding in a military aircraft, provide further support for the view that
fear of disrupting military discipline is the real basis for the Feres
rule.32 At first reading, these decisions appear to conflict with the
holding of Brooks v. United States,33 allowing servicemen who are in-
jured by the government while on leave to bring suit against the United
States. But in Brooks, the furloughed serviceman was not aboard a
military aircraft when injured, and had reverted to a semicivilian
status34 where there is less need for adherence to military discipline.
35
28. Compare United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113 (1954), and Brooks
v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949), with United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149,
151-54 (1966). See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963): "[T]he presence
of a compensation system, persuasive in Feres, does not of necessity preclude a suit
for negligence." Id. at 160 (dictum).
29. See Note, Sovereign Immunity-Federal Tort Claims Act-Injuries to Armed
Services Personnel, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1788, 1792 (1967).
30. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
31. Id. at 112. Chief Justice Warren in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
162 (1963), agreed that this reasoning was the best explanation for the Feres
decision.
32. Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954); accord, United
States v. Carroll, 369 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1966) (reserve member proceeding to
weekend reserve drill).
33. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
34. This semicivilian status can not be precisely defined but seems to exist in at
least two situations. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (serviceman on pass
who commits a crime is within jurisdiction of civilian courts); Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 49 (1949) (serviceman injured by government while on leave can sue).
35. All servicemen on leave are technically subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1964).
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The distinguishing factor in these cases-whether the serviceman is on
a military aircraft where the safety of all aboard might possibly depend
upon strict adherence to military discipline-lobbies forcefully for the
proposition that apprehension about adverse effects on discipline is the
real basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Feres.
Nevertheless, in 1961, the Ninth Circuit in Callaway v. Garber"0
denied that the discipline rationale was the controlling factor in deter-mining whether a serviceman's injury was "incident to service." The
Callaway case involved an accident on a public highway between serv-
icemen in different branches of the armed forces who were on com-
pletely unrelated assignments. The court stated that discipline would
be unaffected by allowing the suit against the government in such cir-
cumstances but found that the plaintiff was nevertheless engaged in an
activity that was "incident to service" and therefore not entitled to sue
the government.3"
When the problem arose again in Lee, the Ninth Circuit once more
denied the right to sue, relying on its strict interpretation of the Feres
rule in Callaway: "The problem presented .. .concerning discipline
etc., has been met and decided by this circuit [in Callaway v. Gar-
ber]."38  Reaffirming its position, the court stated that "the Supreme
Court has never indicated that Feres should be limited to situations
which pose a threat of interference with military discipline. 3 9  This
may be true, as the Ninth Circuit argues, but the converse is also true:
The Supreme Court has never indicated that the Feres rule should be
extended to situations which do not involve military discipline.40  In
fact, the Supreme Court has allowed recovery under the Tort Claims
Act in two cases where no problem of discipline existed. The first case,
Brooks v. United States,41 noted above, involved a serviceman on leave
and therefore not subject to military discipline in any meaningful way;
the second, Brown v. United States,2 involved a discharged serviceman
who claimed that a veterans' hospital had negligently treated a wound
he suffered while still in the service.
It seems, therefore, that discipline should still be considered the
real basis for the Feres rule and that the Ninth Circuit wrongly aban-
doned this rationale in Callaway and again in Lee. Although the court
36. 289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961).
37. Id. at 173-74.
38. United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1968).
39. Id.
40. The appellee argued that the Supreme Court has limited the Feres rule to
instances where discipline is at issue. Brief for Appellee at 15-19, United States v.
Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968).
41. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
42. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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in Lee did give lip service to the discipline rationale, 43 any reference to
discipline was superfluous since the court relied so heavily on the Calla-
way holding that the "incident to service" rule does not require the
presence of any discipline problem. Not only is the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the discipline rationale in Lee superfluous, it is unreasonable
and without support. It is difficult to imagine how military discipline
could have been adversely affected if the suit had been allowed. The
essence of discipline is that a superior's authority be unquestioned and
that he be free from the threat of court action. The Ninth Circuit made
much of the fact that Lee was under orders and subject to the com-
mands of his superiors at the time of the accident;4 4 but the action was
not against his superiors. It was a suit against an independent civilian
agency of the United States and presented no threat to a superior's
authority.
Until the Ninth Circuit decisions in Callaway and Lee, it was es-
tablished that the presence or absence of a discipline problem was the
measure of whether an injury was "incident to service." Congress' con-
tinuing silence on the problem of servicemen's suits suggests its basic
satisfaction with this interpretation of Feres and the Federal Tort Claims
Act.45 The problem in Lee was unique,", however, since the question
was whether Lee's injury was "incident to service," even if he was in-
jured by the negligence of an independent civilian agency of the gov-
ernment. This question cannot be answered simply by showing that
Congress approves of the Feres rule or that there is other available
compensation for Lee's injuries. It can be fairly answered only by
considering the real reasons for limiting a serviceman's right to sue.
The Ninth Circuit, by rejecting the discipline rationale as the basis for
the Feres rule, has answered the question incorrectly.
James J. White*
43. United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1968).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 561.
46. Three cases are cited by the Ninth Circuit in support of the idea that the
Feres rule should be applied to cases in which civilian tortfeasors are involved.
Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1966);
United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951
(1964); Layne v. United States, 295 F.2d 433 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990
(1961). These cases did involve civilian tortfeasors; however, the issue of whether
the government should be subject to suit by a serviceman for the acts of an inde-
pendent civilian agency of the government was not raised.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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